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law right of indemnity against an employer, the principal case merely makes
the right a hollow one.
The instant case will have a major impact on relations between manufacturers and employers in Florida. An increase in leasing arrangements between
manufacturers and employers might be the principal result. By leasing his
equipment, the manufacturer would have a contractual base upon which indemnity could be predicated. 93 However, in a companion decision94 the supreme
court has indicated that "contracts of indemnification which attempt to indemnify the party against its own wrongful acts are viewed with disfavor in
Florida." 95 Therefore, manufacturers will find it difficult to transfer their losses
back to the employer and will inevitably pass the burden on to the consumer in
the form of higher prices.
By abrogating the employer's immunity, the Sunspan court advanced
towards the equitable goal of loss-transfer on a comparative fault basis. However, by failing to alter indemnity's traditional prerequisites to account for
changes in liability concepts, the instant case has halted this advance. In its
quest for purity of form, the court has ignored the equitable background of
indemnity. Consequently, by forcing the manufacturer to absorb the loss
through his enterprise liability, the court implicitly ratified the manufacturer's
subsidization of the worker's compensation system.
DAVID

H. CHARLIP

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INVOCATION AND WAIVER OF
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY JUVENILES
Farev. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)
Charged with murder in juvenile court, respondent' moved to suppress incriminating evidence obtained during custodial interrogation.2 Respondent
claimed he had invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. by requesting the presence of his probation officer during the interroga93. Of course, the manufacturer would have to provide a "hold harmless" provision and
a clause acknowledging the lessee's responsibility to use the product in a safe and proper
manner.
94. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co., 374 So. 2d
487 (Fla. 1979).
95. Id. at 489. The court said that "[sluch contracts will be enforced only if they express
an intent to indemnify against the indemnitee's own wrongful acts in clear and unequivocal
terms." Id.
1. Respondent, M.W.C., was 16 1/2 years old at the time of the offense and had been on
probation for over four years. 422 U.S. 707, 710 (1979).
2. Respondent was taken into custody based on a report that a truck registered in his
mother's name and a person of his description had been seen in the victim's neighborhood on
the night of the murder. Two police officers advised respondent of his constitutional rights
under the Miranda decision, interrogated him, and obtained inculpatory statements and
sketches of the scene of the murder. Id. at 710-11.
3. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
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tion. Finding a waiver of respondent's constitutional right to remain silent,5
the trial courts denied the motion. The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed
respondent's commitment to the Youth Authority.7 In reversing s the California
self .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Accord, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13, cl. 5 which, provides:
"Persons may not ...be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves..-."
However, the instant opinion remarks that the California Supreme Court based its decision
on federal law. Id. at 716-17.
4. The police advised respondent that he was being questioned about a murder and then
advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.. 436 (1966), before beginning the
interrogation:
"Q. [police] ...Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to you?
"A. [respondent] Yeah.
"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to-remain silent and talk to us about this
murder?
"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.
"Q.I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it.
I
"A. Yeah, I might talk to you.
"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here while we talk
about it?
"A. Can I have my probationofficer here?
"Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an
attorney.
"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?
"Q. Huh?
"A. [Repeat of last answer.]
"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good chance we can
talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want
to say something, you can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's
your right. You understand that right?

"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?
"A. Yeah I want to talk to you."
21 Cal. Sd 471, 473-74, 579 P.2d 7, 8, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 359-60 (1978) (emphasis in original).
5. The trial judge stated that the interpretation of a minor's statement is a factual
question to be resolved in each case. In re Michael C., 66 Cal. App. 3d 239 (opinion omitted),
135 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (1977), vacated, 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. .358 (1978).
The trial judge noted as one factor in her decision that respondent indicated he might talk to
the police before he asked for his probation officer and again after his request. Other factors
cited by the judge were respondent's age and previous experience with the court system. The
respondent was on probation and had been to a camp for juvenile offenders. Id.
The trial court distinguished the instant case from People. v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491
P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), because in the instant case there was no indication of lengthy
interrogation. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 239, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 765. In Burton, the California Supreme
Court held that a juvenile's request for a parent during custodial interrogation, constituted
an invocation of his fifth amendment right to remain.silent. 6 Cal. 3d at 383-84, 491 P.2d at
798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
6. Michael C., No. 466633 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 10, 1976).
7. In re Michael C., 66 Cal. App. 3d 239, 135 Cal. Rptr., 762 (1977). Respondent -was
adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to CAL. W=L. & INST. CODE ANN. §§ 602,
725 (West 1972) for violation of the. penal code and was committed to the Youth Authority
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Supreme Court held respondent's request to see his probation officer during
custodial interrogation constituted an invocation of his fifth amendment right
to remain silent. The United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, a
juvenile's request to see his probation officer during custodial interrogation is
not a per se invocation of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."
The doctrine of parens patriae, which postulates that the state is the
guardian of the public welfare, is the philosophical and historical origin of the
juvenile court system.12 Originally, minors above the age of criminal responsibility 3 were tried and punished for criminal offenses as adults.. With the
advent of the humanitarian reform movement in the United States during the

pursuant to §§ 731, 736. Juvenile court proceedings are not considered criminal proceedings
in California. Id. § 203 (Supp. 1979). The juvenile court made the finding required by § 202
that long-term commitment was necessary for the best interests of respondent and the protection of the public, and that respondent's parents were incapable of providing the training
and supervision required. Record at 9, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
8. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 478, 579 P.2d 7, 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1978).
9. Id. at 477, 579 P.2d at 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Relying on the statutory duty of a
probation officer in California to represent the interests of the juvenile and that the respondent's probation officer had admonished the juvenile to notify him immediately of any
police contact, the California Supreme Court held that respondent's request to see his probation officer was per se an invocation of his fifth amendment rights. The foundation for the
decision was the statement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that "[i]f the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted). The California Supreme
Court had previously interpreted the Miranda statement to support the conclusion that any
conduct inconsistent with a present willingness to speak with the police amounts to an invocation of the fifth amendment right to remain silent. See People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948,
956, 464 P.2d 114, 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1970) (cited in In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471,
475, 579 P.2d 7, 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (1978)). A juvenile's request for his father during
custodial interrogation was deemed to be the normal reaction of a juvenile suspect seeking
advice and therefore rendered the suspect's confession obtained by interrogation after the
request had been made as inadmissible. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 948, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1971) (cited in In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d at 475, 579 P.2d at 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
360 (1978)).
10. 442 U.S. at 728.
11. Id. The Court stated in dictum that the admissibility of statements obtained after a
juvenile's request for his probation officer should be determined by review of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Id.
12.

H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN

THE UNITED STATES

4 (1927). Translated literally, parens

patriaemeans "father of the country."
13. At common law children below the age of seven were presumed incapable of forming
a criminal intent. Children aged seven to fourteen were considered rebuttably incapable, and
children over the age of fourteen were treated as adults. W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN
DEFENSE OF YOUTH 1 (1972). The courts of chancery exercising equity powers were the protectors of neglected children. H. Lou, supra note 12, at 4-5.
14. "The child was arrested, put into prison, indicated by the grand jury, tried by a petit
jury, under all the forms and technicalities of our criminal law, with the aim of ascertaining
whether it had done the specific act - nothing else - and if it had, then of visiting the punishment of the state upon it." Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 106 (1909). See
also H. Lou, supra note 12, at 13-14.
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nineteenth century,15 houses of refuge 6 and juvenile courts"7 were established
as instruments of reformation rather than retribution. 8 Nevertheless in separating juveniles from adults 9 and eliminating the features of an adult criminal
proceeding, the juvenile courts operated outside the framework of constitutional guarantees. 20 The only checks on the broad discretion afforded juvenile
courts were vague notions of fairness and justice.21
The United States Supreme Court considered the voluntariness 22 of selfincriminating statements by a juvenile in Haley v. Ohio.23 The fifteen-year-old
appellant confessed to murder charges after he was held incommunicado and
questioned by relays of police from midnight until 5:00 a.m. 24 In the three days
following the signing of the confession, an attorney was twice denied access to
the juvenile, and his mother was not allowed to visit.2s Recognizing that a child
is "an easy victim of the law" 26 and "cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity," 2' the Court held the confession inadmissible. 28 The
15. Among the issues popular in the 19th century were child labor, prison reform, women's

suffrage, and the abolition of slavery. H. Lou, supra note 12, at 14.
16. The Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, largely composed of Quakers,
opened the New York House of Refuge in 1825 as the first reformatory in the United States.
Juvenile vagrants and criminals were rehabilitated through work, education, and religion.
R. PicKErr, House OF REFUGE 21-85 (1969). See generally B. PEIRE, A HALF CENTURY wrrT
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS (1869).
17. Although several states, notably Massachusetts, enacted legislation differentiating adult
and juvenile offenders, the first comprehensive juvenile court system was the Juvenile Court
of Cook County, created by the Illinois legislature in 1899. H. Lou, supra note 12, at 16-20.
See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 ILL. LAws ch. 133, § 5.
18. See H. Lou, supra note 12, at 19-20. But see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, 22 STAN.
L. REv. 1187, 1193-1204, 1221-30 (1970). Fox points out that physical punishment and coerced
religious practices were mainstays of the institution.
19. "Juvenile" refers to a person below the age of majority. Although the jurisdictional
age varies among the states, the youngest maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction is 16.
S. DAvs, RIGHTS OF JuvENIEs: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 233-49 (1974).
20. Juvenile courts maintained an atmosphere of informality as opposed to an adversarial
setting, did not adhere to rules of evidence, employed social reports extensively, and provided

judges with few guidelines for dispositions.
ADMINISTRATION

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

1-19 (1967).
21. Julian Mack, a juvenile court judge, recognized the potential for autocratic power in
the juvenile justice system and recommended that juvenile judges be trained lawyers with a
genuine interest in children. Mack, supra note 14, at 118-19.
22. This is a reflection of the principle that involuntary confessions are inadmissible into
evidence. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The two-fold rationale for excluding
involuntary confessions is that the government may not compel anyone to incriminate himself
and that coerced confessions are unreliable. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 868, 385-86 (1964).
See generally 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §§ 820(b)-(d), 822-823 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (tracing
the Supreme Court's treatment of confessions beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1986), and noting testimonial unreliability and due process guidelines as the rationale for
exclusion of confessions from evidence).
23. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
24. Id. at 598.
25. Id. at 600. The attorney was retained by the juvenile's mother. Id.
26. Id. at 599.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 607.
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Court reiterated the Haley sentiments in Gallegos v. Colorado-9 by stating a
juvenile "cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admission."0 In Gallegos, a fourteenyear-old admitted to an assault and robbery immediately upon questioning by
police.3 ' He signed a formal confession after five days of incommunicado detention.32 The Court discounted the teenager's ability to know and assert his
constitutional rights without adult advice3 3 and held that, under the totality of
35
the circumstances,34 the confession was obtained in violation of due process.
The Supreme Court first addressed the procedures used in the juvenile
justice system in Kent v. United States.36 Dissatisfied with the District of
Columbia juvenile court procedures,3 7 the Court held that a juvenile is entitled
to a hearing on waiver of jurisdiction 3s conducted pursuant to "essentials of
due process and fair treatment."'s In the landmark decision in In re Gault,40
the Court further delineated due process considerations of juvenile court proceedings. Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old probationer accused of making a
lewd telephone call, was taken into custody and questioned by the juvenile
29. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
So. Id. at 54.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 49-50.
33. Id. at 54-55. Although Gallegos was decided before Miranda, the police advised the
juvenile of his right to an attorney. The juvenile did not ask either for an attorney or for his
parents. The Court felt that the juvenile was incapable of understanding the consequences
of answering questions posed by the police and of protecting his own interests because of his
youth. Id. at 54. The opinion emphasized that a child's immaturity handicaps him in dealing
with police interrogators and that adult advice would relieve this disparity. Id.
34. Id. at 55. "[J]udgment as to legal voluntariness vel non under the Due Process Clause
is drawn from the totality of the relevant circumstances of a particular situation." Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 606 (1961). See generally Kamisar, Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966).
35. 370 U.S. at 55. "There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the
totality of circumstances .
Id. In an examination of the totality of the circumstances
I..."
under which the confession was made to ascertain its voluntariness, the factors the Court
found indicative of inherent coercion were the juvenile's age, the length of detention, the
failure of the police to send for his parents, the failure of the police to bring him before a
juvenile court judge immediately, and lack of adult assistance. Id.
36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. Id. at 556. At the root of the Court's dissatisfaction were the facts that children were
not entitled to constitutional protections and that the juvenile justice system was ill-equipped
to provide effective rehabilitative treatment. Id.
88. Id. at 561. The Court also found that the juvenile's counsel should have access to the
juvenile's social records and that there should be a statement of the court's reasons for the
waiver of jurisdiction. Id. at 561-63.
39. Id. at 552-64. Although the decision turned on construction of D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914
(1961) (current version at § 11-1553 (1965)), the due process clause clearly was applied.
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of
juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1967) (analysis of impact of Gault decision); Lefstein, Stapleton
& Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc'y REv.
491 (1969) (study of implementation of Gault in three urban juvenile court systems); Paulsen,
Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1967) (effect of extending right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination to juvenile system).
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court judge at two hearings. 4' Neither the juvenile nor his parents received
formal notice of the charges, and the only notice of the hearings to the parents
or the child was a note from the juvenile's probation officer. 42 The Supreme
Court stated that insofar as a finding of delinquency amounted to penal incarceration, 43 the juvenile justice system had failed in its mission of rehabilitation. 44 Accordingly, constitutional due process for juveniles required notice
of charges, advisement of the right to counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.- s
Subsequent to Gault, the Supreme Court has applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof4 6 and the prohibition against double jeopardy47
to juvenile proceedings. Although the gap between rights accorded adults and
those accorded juveniles in criminal proceedings has narrowed, it has not
entirely closed. 48 Constitutional safeguards not expressly extended to juveniles 49
41. 887 U.S. at 4-7.
42. Id. at 5-6.

43. Id. at 27. For example, Gault, a teenager, was committed to the State Industrial School
until he attained majority for making a lewd telephone call. The sentence for an adult committing the same offense was a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment not to exceed two months.
Id. at 29.
44. Id. at 22. As support for this conclusion, the opinion cited the high recidivism rate
and the high crime rate among juveniles. Id. However, the Court stated that implication of
constitutional procedures would not impair the benefits of the juvenile court system. Id.
45. Id. at 81-57. The Court specifically did not rule on the right to appellate review or
the right to a transcript of the proceedings. Id. at 57-58.
46. In re Winship, 897 U.S. 858 (1970). Appellant, a 12-year-old, was adjudicated delinquent in family court for larceny of $112 from a woman's pocketbook. A preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof was employed by the trial court. Id. at 361. The Court found
that constitutional due process required the same standard of proof as would have been
applied in an adult criminal proceeding. Id. at 367.
47. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). The juvenile court in Breed found that respondent had committed an armed robbery and was not a fit subject for treatment by the
juvenile justice system. Respondent, aged 17, was then prosecuted as an adult and found
guilty of the same offense. Id. at 521-26. Because respondent was subject to stigma and loss
of liberty as a result of the juvenile adjudicatory hearing, the Court held that he had been
exposed to the risk of loss of liberty twice. Id. at 530-81.
48. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). McKeiver, 16 years old at the
time of the offense, was adjudged a delinquent by the juvenile court and placed on probation
for participating with 20-30 youths who chased three young teenagers and took 25 cents from
them. Id. at 535-36. The Court was reluctant to dispense with the informality of the juvenile
court or to abandon the distinctions between the juvenile court and adult proceedings. Id.
at 551.
49. The right to bail has not been expressly applied to minors by the United States
Supreme Court. There is a split of authority among the states as to whether juveniles may be
released on bail. Compare Estes v. Hopp, 78 Wash. 3d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968) (denial of
release on bail is not denial of due process and would be adverse to juvenile's best interests)
with Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960) (commitment to training school is a
deprivation of liberty triggering Bill of Rights). The right to counsel at a line-up was prescribed for adults in Gilbert v. California, 888 U.S. 263 (1967) and in United States v. Wade,
888 U.S. 218 (1967). Several courts have applied the right to counsel at a line-up to juvenile
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 728 (1970) (relied on Gault); In re
Carl T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 844, 81 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969) (compelled by Gault and state law on
evidence). But cf. Jackson v. State, 17 Md. App. 167, 800 A.2d 430 (1978) (juvenile proceedings
are not criminal proceedings, therefore right to counsel only when juvenile jurisdiction waived).
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include the right to a jury trial in criminal juvenile proceedings and the right
to in-custody Miranda warnings of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, o
A majority of jurisdictions have followed Gallegos and applied the totality
of the circumstances test to evaluate the validity of a waiver of fifth amendment rights by juvenile offenders51 The factors courts have examined include:
age;5 2 methods of interrogation; 53 length of interrogations;5 4 and whether the
accused was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends,
or an attorney. 5 Whether an interested adult was present during interrogation

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), spoke to the fourth amendment prohibition against
search and seizure for adults. The fourth amendment has been applied by some courts in the
juvenile setting. See, e.g., In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968) (exclusionary rules
applicable to the juveniles but search was incident to a lawful arrest); State v. Lowry, 95 N.J.
Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967) (constitutional right of privacy applicable to all persons,
exclusionary rule requires fair dealing and instills respect for law and order); In re Harvey,
222 Pa. Super. Ct. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972) (no state interest in denying juvenile right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court mandated that a suspect in custody be informed that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court,
that he has the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be appointed for him if he
cannot afford counsel. Id. at 467-3. The Court imposed a heavy burden on the state to prove
that a statement made without the presence of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently
and without compulsion. The standard for proof of a waiver of any constitutional privilege
was established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), which recognized a presumption
against waivers of constitutional rights and determination of the issue based on the circumstances of the case. Id. at 464-65. See generally Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation: WarnDAME LAw. 479 (1967). The
ing and Waivers -Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NoT
instant case is the first United States Supreme Court decision which specifically addresses the
pre-adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings. Although Gault held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to juveniles, the facts of the case confined
the issues to procedures of the adjudicatory hearing. 387 U.S. at 13, 43. The Court in the
instant case assumed the Miranda principles were applicable. 99 S. Ct. at 2568 n.4.
51. Several decisions cite People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1967), which specified application of the totality of the circumstances test to juveniles. In
Lara, the California Supreme Court ruled that a minor is capable of making a voluntary
confession without the assistance of an adult and that admissibility of a minor's confession is
dependent upon his intelligence, age, experience, and ability to understand the consequences
of his confession. Id. at 383, 432 P.2d at 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 599. See also United States v.
Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972) (each case to be considered separately from the subjective
viewpoint of the individual interrogated); Parker v. State, 351 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Ct. App.), writ
quashed, 351 So. 2d 938 (1977) (evaluating entire list of circumstances surrounding waiver);
Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976) (age alone not determinative of validity of
waiver); State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966) (waiver is a factual matter to be
decided in each case).
52. See, e.g., State v. Carder, 3 Ohio App. 2d 381, 210 N.E.2d 714 (1965) (law provides that
a minor may make a voluntary confession).
53. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 280 A.2d 260 (1971) (confession inadmissible when 16-year-old kept overnight without food and denied permission to speak to mother).
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harmon, 440 Pa. 195, 269 A.2d 744 (1970) (confession
inadmissible, the court refusing to condone tactics used in daylong interrogation).
55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972) (father at
police station but not allowed to see son until confession was made). Other factors included in
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of a juvenile was considered by the Court in Haley,56 Fallegos,57 and Gault.5
Several states by statutes 9 or case law60 require the presence of either legal
counsel, parents, or an interested adult to ensure the validity of a juvenile's!
waiver of constitutional rights. A juvenile held incommunicado is thought less
knowledgeable and mature than his adult interrogators. Therefore, the presence

of an interested adult may help to decrease this disparity. 6'
In addition to the special factors for determination of waiver of a constitutional right by a juveniler2 several courts have considered a relaxed standard
for finding a junvenile has invoked his fifth amendment rights. Specifically, a
juvenile's request to see his parents during custodial interrogation has been
deemed an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.- In People v.
the totality of the circumstances test are education, knowledge of the charge and of the rights
to remain silent and to be represented by counsel, whether the interrogation is before or
after the filing of charges, whether the accused had previously refused to give statements, and
whether the accused later repudiated an extra-judicial statement. West v. United States, 399
F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968).
56. 332 U.S. at 600. "He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim
first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence
of the law, as he knows it, crush him." Id.
57. 370 U.S. at 55, "A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner
the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a
less unequal footing with his interrogators." Id.
58. 887 U.S. at 55. "If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was
not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." Id.
59.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(1) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137

(West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25(A) (Supp. 1975); OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1109(a) (West Supp. 1979).
60. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind.431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972) (age is a dearly definable standard);
State v. Dino, - La. -, 359 So. 2d 586, (1978) (specifically rejects totality of the circumstances as
speculative but bases decision on state constitution), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977) (juvenile must have opportunity to
consult with an informed and interested adult).
61. The adults other than legal counsel or legal guardian which courts have considered
as adult friends include a social worker, People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235, 571 P.2d 305 (1977)
(statements suppressed after social worker ruled not to have special interest in child); a sister,
In re F.D.P., 352 A.2d 378 (D.C. App. 1976) (confession admissible when juvenile confessed
between time of requesting sister and her arrival); a grandmother, State v. Tolliver, 561
S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1977) (statements held inadmissible because juvenile was living with
his grandmother and police contacted juvenile's mother, who did not appear); a prison
counselor, Commonwealth v. Thomas, 481 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 392 A.2d 820 (1978) (waiver
voluntary if made after consultation with adult interested in the juvenile's welfare and in-

formed of juvenile's rights).
62. See notes 58-60 supraand accompanying text.
63. See People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 384-85, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971);
Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976). The Dowst court held that a minor's
request for his parents constitutes an assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination and
a subsequent confession is inadmissible if made before the juvenile is allowed to call his
parents or before the police have made a good faith effort to notify his parents. Id. Contra,
Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 443 U.S' 904 (1979); People
App. 3d 304, 364 N.E.2d 806 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978); State v.
v. Riley, 49 Ill.
Young, 220 Kan. 541, 552 P.2d 905 (1976).'
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Burton,64 the California Supreme Court held a minor subjected to custodial
interrogation without an attorney invokes his fifth amendment right to remain
silent when he requests his parents' presence at the interrogation. 6 In Burton,
a sixteen-year old charged with two counts of first degree murder asked to see
his parents. His request was denied although his father was present at the
police station. The police advised the minor of his Miranda rights and commenced an interrogation which resulted in a full confession.66 The court posited
that a minor in custody would not normally call an attorney but would seek
assistance from a parent or guardian.67 Therefore, a juvenile's request for his
parents reflects a desire for assistance and an unwillingness to proceed with
interrogation.s
In the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme
Court decision that a juvenile's request to see his probation officer during
custodial interrogation constitutes a per se invocation of the right to remain
silent.69 The Court endorsed Miranda's"rigid rule" that all interrogation must
cease upon the suspect's request for an attorney because that rule specifically
informs police, prosecutors, and courts of the point at which a statement becomes inadmissible. 70 However, the Court noted the Miranda decision was
premised on the unique role of the attorney in the criminal justice system. 71
After lengthy examination of the probation officer's role in the juvenile context, the majority of the Court concluded a probation officer is incapable of
serving the function of an attorney for a juvenile suspect during custodial
interrogation.72 A probation officer may be untrained in law and advocacy,
does not have the power to act on behalf of the juvenile probationer, and cannot safeguard any confidence the juvenile relates to him.7 3 As a state-employed
peace officer, a conflict exists between the probation officer's obligation to the
state and the protection of the juvenile defendant's rights.74 The Court did not
64. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
65. Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
66. Id. at 379-80, 491 P.2d at 796, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
67. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 797-98, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
68. Id. at 383, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
69. 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979). The Court has also been reluctant to extend Miranda in
other situations. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (inculpatory statements made
after request for attorney admissible for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974) (testimony of witness whose identity was revealed by interrogation without
full Miranda warnings ruled admissible); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (admissions
inadmissible in case in chief may be used for impeachment purposes).
70. 442 U.S. at 718. This virtue is thought to outweigh the burden on law enforcement
and prosecution of excluding some confessions. Id. The instant case is one illustration of this
burden; the Court of Appeal remarked that without respondent's confession the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction. In re Michael C., 66 Cal. App. 3d 239 (opinion ommitted), 135 Cal. Rptr. at 763 n.l.
71. 442 U.S. at 719. An attorney is trained to protect his client's constitutional rights by
preventing the police from using improper techniques and ensuring the accuracy of statements
admitted at trial. Id.
72. Id. at 721.
73. Id. at 719-20.
74. A California probation officer for juveniles is charged with representation of the
interests of the juvenile and is also granted the powers of a peace officer. CAL. WELF. & INST.
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find a probation officer the equivalent of an attorney despite the statutory duty
to represent the juvenile's interests75 and the close relationship between the
probation officer and juvenile.76 Thus, the Court concluded that an extension
of Miranda to the probation officer context did not afford greater protection
for the juvenile's rights and therefore unjustified. 77
The instant Court advocated a case-by-case determination of the validity of
a waiver of constitutional rights made by a juvenile defendant utilizing the
totality of the circumstances test.78 The Court reasoned use of the totality of the
circumstances approach by juvenile courts is appropriate because those courts
possess a "special expertise" in handling juvenile matters. 79 Applying the
totality of the circumstances test to the instant case, the Court concluded respondent voluntarily and knowingly waived his fifth amendment right to remain silent80 The factors the Court examined and relied upon to reach this
conclusion included the respondent's age and prior experience with the juvenile
court system, the finding that the interrogation was neither lengthy nor improperly conducted, and the lack of evidence of coercion in the interrogation
transcript.5 1
CODE ANN.

§§ 280, 283 (West Supp. 1978);

CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 830.5 (West Supp. 1978).

The instant Court cited a separate concurring opinion to the California Supreme Court decision that a probation officer must counsel the juvenile to cooperate with the police. 99 S. Ct.
at 2570 (quoting In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 479, 579 P.2d 7, 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358,
363 (1978) (Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., concurring)).
75. See note 74 supra.
76. 442 U.S. at 720-21. In the instant case, the probation officer had counseled respondent
about family problems and had previously reprimanded the respondent for not informing him
immediately of a contact with the police. Record at 27-28, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979).
77. 442 U.S. at 723. The burden created by the inflexible per se rule of Miranda was
accepted because it afforded increased protection for the constitutional rights of a suspect
undergoing custodial interrogation. Id. at 717-18. The central concern expressed in the brief
amid curiae is that effective law enforcement is hampered by the inflexibility of the per se
rule of Miranda and that any extension is unacceptable. Brief Amici Curiae in support of the
Petitioner. Id. at 8-10, 17.
78. Id. at 724-25. The totality of the circumstances test has long been used to evaluate
waivers of constitutional rights by adults. See note 34 supra.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 725. Indeed, the Court noted that a juvenile court might find that the
circumstances of a case in which the juvenile requested his probation officer or his parents
warranted the determination of an invocation of the right to remain silent. Id. See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
80. 442 U.S. at 726. In a separate dissent, Justice Powell applied the totality of the circumstances test with the "greatest care" reserved for juveniles and came to an opposite conclusion. The factors which entered into his application of the test were respondent's age, the
length of the interrogation, and respondents immaturity, despite his previous experience with
the juvenile justice system. According to Justice Powell, the transcript of the interrogation
revealed the limited understanding of the respondent in his remark about a police officer
impersonating an attorney, and the trial court judge noted that respondent was crying during
the interrogation. Id. at 733 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also found persuasive
the probation officer's instructions to the respondent to call the officer in the event of police
contact. Id. at 733-34. He concluded that the continuation of the interrogation after denial of
respondent's request for his probation officer was inconsistent with the special handling due
juveniles in order to assure voluntary statements. Id,
81. Id at 726-27.
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The dissent authored by Justice Marshall advocated a broad construction of
the Miranda decision.82 By advising the accused of his rights and entitling him
to the presence of an attorney during interrogation, Miranda attempted to
counteract the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation. 3 The dissent
agreed with the Burton rationale that a juvenile in custody would secure an
attorney through his parents, and therefore a juvenile's desire for adult assistance indicates a desire to remain silent.8 4 Because juveniles are particularly

vulnerable to police tactics due to immaturity and inexperience, 85 the dissent
reasoned a juvenile's request for an adult obligated to represent the juvenile's
interests consonant with the per se invocation delineated in Miranda.8 Accepting the California Supreme Court's assessment of the duty of California probation officers to represent the juvenile's interests,8 3 the dissent found that in
California, a juvenile's request for his probation officer would fulfill the function of an invocation of fifth amendment rights, because the juvenile is seeking
88
legal assistance or intimates an unwillingness to speak with police.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in the instant case addressed only
the effect of a juvenile's request for his probation officer, the rationale employed
by the Court has implications for a juvenile's request for any adult other than
an attorney. Other individuals have no duty to represent the juvenile's interests89 and without legal training cannot fulfill the role of attorney for a juvenile
during custodial interrogation. 90 However, the effect of a juvenile's request for
a parent remains clouded.91 Parents, just as probation officers, lack legal training and may have interests conflicting with those of the juvenile.92 Parents
82. Id. at 728 (Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
83. Id. at 728-29.
84. See People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 797-98, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6
(1971). The California Supreme Court found it normal that a minor seeking assistance in
dealing with the police would ask to see his parents. The court considered it unduly restrictive
to limit the form of a minor's request for adult assistance to a request for an attorney. Id.
85. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
86. 442 U.S. at 729-30 (Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See text accompanying
notes 64-68 supra.
87. In addition to the statutory duty discussed in note 74 supra, California courts have
dealt with the close relationship between a minor and his probation officer. See, e.g., Bryan v.
Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 575, 587, 498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1972) (admissions
made by juvenile to probation officer excluded in criminal prosecution to further the protective and rehabilitative rationale of the juvenile justice system); In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d
855, 860 & n.7, 464 P.2d 127, 131 & n.7, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675 & n.7 (1970) (judge should not
review probation officer's report before jurisdictional hearings to avoid jeopardizing important and close relationship between juvenile and probation officer).
88. 442 U.S. at 732.
89. See note 73 supra.
90. The California Supreme Court distinguished clergymen, football coaches, and music
teachers from probation officers by the existence of a statutory duty imposed on probation
officers to represent the child's interests. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 477, 579 P.2d 7, 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358,
361 (1978).
91. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
92. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977) (father declined
to accompany juvenile to police station); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975)
(child allegedly accompanied father while breaking and entering, father escaped).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 8

1980]

CASE COMMENTS

often are the complainants in juvenile cases or induce the child to make incriminating statements.93 The instant Court recognized that juveniles in trouble
normally turn to parents for help and consequently included a juvenile's re-

quest for his parents or probation officer as a factor to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test.94 The Court's refusal to recognize

such a request as a per se invocation of the juvenile's fifth amendment rights
ignores the fact that juveniles may be unable to understand the value of legal
95
counsel or unable to retain an attorney.
In prescribing the totality of the circumstances test, the Court commended
the flexibility that approach affords judges and police in handling juvenile
offenders.9 However, while flexibility allows the individualized treatment essential to a scheme of rehabilitation, it also allows the excessive judicial discretion in the juvenile system lamented in Gault.97 Furthermore, such a flexible
standard for waiver of a constitutional right results in a loss of the prophylactic
value achieved by specific rules.9 " The totality of the circumstances test must be
applied by judges after the interrogation has yielded a confession. Police and
prosecutors are left without specific guidelines for the interrogation of juve-

niles.9 9 Haley and Gallegos, however, indicate that prophylactic rules seem
particularly desirable in the juvenile setting due to the special condition of
youth. 20 o

Despite the shortcomings of a totality of the circumstances approach in the
juvenile setting, the instant decision is a logical extension of existing case law.
The instant case reiterates Gault's recognition that juveniles possess due process
rights requiring safeguarding.' 01 Furthermore, consistent with McKeiver, the
93. See, e.g., Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1972) (mother threatened to
hit child if he did not tell the truth); Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970)
(mother intoxicated); Buchanan v. State, 268 Ind. 503, 376 N.E.2d 1131 (1978) (father urged
child to tell the truth). Cf. In re L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973) (father incarcerated and subject to police pressure).
94. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text, supra.
95. See Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGo L. Rxv. 39 (1970).
A simplified warning was read to 90 juveniles aged 13 to 17, and they were interviewed and
scored as to understanding. The simplified warning was: "You don't have to talk to me at all,
now or later on, it is up to you. If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and xepeat what
you say, against you. If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you
can have one free before and during questioning by me now or by anyone else later on. Do
you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I have just told you? Remembering
what I've just told you, do you want to talk to me?" Id. at 40. The conclusions were that only
a small percentage of juveniles were capable of making an intelligent waiver of their constitutional rights and that the simplified form failed to increase understanding significantly.

Id, at 54.
96. 442 US. at 725-26.
97. 387 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1967). See notes 40-45 and accompanying text, supra.
98. 442 U.S. at 718. See note 70 and accompanying text, supra.
99. 442 U.S. at 725-26. The opinion approves a lack of rigid restraints enabling police
and courts to deal with older juveniles who do make a valid waiver of constitutional rights. Id.
100. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. at 55; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 600. See notes 56-57
supra.
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. Gault also anticipated special problems with waiver of
constitutional rights by juveniles. The Court stated that different techniques may prove
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Court emphasized the traditional flexibility demanded throughout the juvenile
justice system. 02 Simultaneous recognition of juveniles' constitutional rights
and prescription of a flexible standard for waiver of those rights underscores
the tension inherent in the juvenile justice system when the state acts as both
guardian and prosecutor. 03 Juveniles are rehabilitated for the sake of the individual and incarcerated for the safety of the community. Under the instant
decision, juvenile court judges will resolve the imbalance between parens
patriaeand due process.
If juveniles possess constitutional rights equivalent to those of adults,
greater safeguards are required. The special treatment juveniles derive from the
totality of the circumstances approach results in inconsistency due to a case-bycase, judge-by-judge application. If juveniles' rights are to be afforded greater
procedural protection, 0 4 the best opportunity is through ameliorative measures
promulgated by the states.
SusAN HuSSEY FREEMON

necessary but that the principles behind the privilege against self-incrimination were the same
as for adults. Id. at 55.
102. See note 20 and accompanying text, supra; note 48 supra.
103. See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
104. Many writers have advocated special protection for juveniles' constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Note, PreadjudicatoryConfessions and Consent Searches: Placing the Juvenile on the
Same Footingas an Adult, 57 B.U.L. REv. 778 (1977) (favors per se rule for parents' presence);
Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1149 (1968) (concluding parents are
best suited to advise a minor suspect); Note, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a
Parent's Presence, 77 DICK. L. REv. 543 (1973) (parent should be accessible if juvenile so
desires). Several authoritative bodies also have recommended additional protection of juveniles'
constitutional rights. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, JOINT

COMMISSION

ON

JUVENILE

JUSTICE STANDARDS,

STANDARDS

RELATING

TO

POLICE

HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS 69 (10th ed. 1977); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 27(b)
(1968); MODEL FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 26, 28 (1975).
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